Introduction
Enormous amounts of money have been spent worldwide on subsidies for the fisheries industries. Many of those subsidies are possibly detrimental to resource conservation and management (Clark, Munro, and Sumaila 2005) . this is mainly because the subsidies support overcapacity in the fisheries.
While it is not easy to define and obtain accurate data on fisheries subsidies, some estimates are available.
1 According to the organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2006) , government financial transfers (GFTs) to marine capture fisheries in oECD countries amounted to US$6.47 billion in 2003. this represented about 20% of the value of world production (i.e., landings) in the industry. Most of the GFTs were devoted to management, research, and enforcement (38.8%, $2,508 million) and infrastructure (35.0%, $2,263 million). Funds were also spent on decommissioning schemes (6.7%, $432 million), income support (6.7%, $435 million), investment and modernization (3.2%, $206 million), access payments (3.0%, $194 million), and other cost-reducing transfers and direct payments (7.0%, $454 million). the last item includes price support schemes.
Based on case studies of Japan, the European Union, Norway, the United States, Russia, and China, Milazzo (1998) estimates the aggregate level of subsidies to fisheries 2 Budgeted subsidies include development grants, state investments, foreign access payments, market promotion, and price supports. Unbudgeted subsidies include subsidized loans, fuel tax exemptions, and income tax deferrals. Cross-sectoral subsidies include aids to shipbuilding and fisheries infrastructure. Conservation subsidies include vessel and fishing permit buybacks, stock enhancement, and R&D in clean harvesting gear. Finally, resource rent subsidies include user fees. 3 the present situation of the negotiation is "too little convergence on even the technical issues, and indeed virtually none on the core substantive issues" (Wto 2011, p. 1) . there has been no progress in the negotiation since Wto (2011) was circulated in April 2011. 4 In the Chair Texts, Annex VIII (pp. 87-93) of the SCM Agreement addresses fisheries subsidies. In Article I.1, "income support for natural or legal persons engaged in marine wild capture fishing" and "price support for products of marine capture fishing" are identified as (e) and (f) of subsidies that shall be prohibited (WTO 2007) . 5 See, for example, , Clark (1990) , and Brander and taylor (1997). in the world in the 1990s as US$14.0-20.5 billion annually. He categorizes fisheries subsidies into i) budgeted subsidies, ii) unbudgeted subsidies, iii) cross-sectoral subsidies, iv) conservation subsidies, and v) resource rent subsidies.
2 Khan et al. (2006) and Sumaila et al. (2006) provide another estimate. Khan et al. (2006) estimate global non-fuel fisheries subsidies for 11 subsidy types from the database of subsidy programs reported in marine capture fisheries for 144 coastal countries (both developed and developing countries) from 1995 to 2005. they estimate that global nonfuel subsidies are US$25.7 billion annually. About 49% (US$12.7 billion) is provided by 38 developed countries and the remaining 51% (US$13.0 billion) by 103 developing countries. In developed countries, subsidies for fisheries management programs and services are the major program (US$5.1 billion). In developing countries, on the other hand, fishing port construction and renovation programs (US$7.3 billion) and fishery development projects and support services (US$2.2 billion) are the major programs.
The use of fisheries subsidies is discussed at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Members of the Wto are currently conducting negotiations to clarify and improve disciplines on fisheries subsidies in the Rules Negotiations at the Doha Round (WTO 2007 (WTO , 2008 . At present, there are no specific regulations on fisheries subsidies in the WTO. The new regulations on fisheries subsidies are planned as additions to the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) as Annex VIII. In the negotiations, the prohibition on certain forms of fisheries subsidies that may contribute to overcapacity and overfishing was discussed. At the same time, the establishment of appropriate and effective special and differential (S&D) treatment for developing and least-developed countries is also discussed in the new regulations. In the draft of the new regulations (WTO 2007), exceptions (both general and S&D) are conditioned upon the establishment and operation of fisheries management systems and measures. It is, however, controversial whether the WTO, which is not a fisheries management organization, should use binding conditionality concerning fisheries management.
3
The main purpose of this article is to analyze how fisheries subsidies will affect the incentive of people in the fisheries sector. I consider two types of subsidies: one is for income support; another is for price supports that raise the domestic producer price of fisheries products. In the Draft Consolidated Chair Texts of the AD and SCM Agreements (Wto 2007), which is the basis for negotiations at the Doha Round, these two types of subsidies are included in subsidies that should be prohibited. 4 thus, an analysis of those subsidies could provide some implications for negotiations at the Wto. I illustrate how the effects of reducing existing subsidies on fisheries output will differ, depending on the conditions of the economy. I construct a simple model of two sectors: fisheries and manufacturing. A key element is variable labor supply. Each worker chooses the optimal supply of labor by taking into account the substitution between consumption of goods and leisure. Consequently, the supply of labor is not perfectly elastic. this is a crucial departure from the standard model in fisheries economics, in which the supply of fishing effort is assumed to be perfectly elastic.
5 Since actual fishing efforts by fishers are unlikely to be perfectly elastic, this framework will be relevant to analyze the effects of changing fisher-ies subsidies. Moreover, I postulate that fishers follow non-cooperative Nash behavior; i.e., they choose their fishing efforts, taking other fishers' total catch of fish as a given. Thus, even in the case of unregulated fisheries, rents in the fisheries sector are not necessarily fully dissipated.
the main results are as follows. First, in a small open economy (SoE) where catch quotas are not enforced and there are no alternative employment opportunities for workers in the fisheries sector, a permanent reduction in subsidies for income support will increase fisheries output in the short run. This is because workers in the fisheries sector try to partially offset reductions in income from cuts in subsidies by increasing labor, which results in a longer time spent fishing. In the long run, the subsidy cut reduces the steady-state fish stock due to increased fishing. A reduction in subsidies for raising the domestic producer prices of fish has a similar effect if the elasticity of substitution between leisure and the aggregate consumption goods is low. Second, in an SoE where catch quotas are strictly enforced and there are alternative employment opportunities for workers in the fisheries sector, a permanent reduction in fisheries subsidies has no effect on total fisheries output or on the steady-state fish stock as long as catch quotas are binding. A further reduction in fisheries subsidies may cause catch quotas to be no longer binding. In such a case, a reduction in subsidies reduces fisheries output both in the short run and in the long run and may increase the steady-state level of fish stock. Third, in the trade between two countries, the world relative price of fisheries product is endogenously determined and hence is affected by any change in fisheries subsidies. If the relative supply of fisheries product increases, then the world relative price will decrease. this indirect effect through price changes reinforces the direct effect of reducing fisheries subsidies. Consequently, even in the case of trade between two countries, subsidy reform that reduces either income supports or price supports can expand the world catch of fish in the short run. In the long run, the world fish stocks will be reduced by the subsidy reform unless the price change is large. The results in this article suggest that proper management of fisheries resources is important for subsidy reform to mitigate overfishing and conserve fisheries resources.
A number of existing studies are relevant to this article. Munro and Sumaila (2002) and Clark, Munro, and Sumaila (2005) investigate the possible negative effects of subsidies for vessel decommissioning schemes. Both papers demonstrate that buyback subsidies generally have a negative impact on resource conservation, if they are anticipated by fishers. Lindebo (2005) examines the impact of the EU's fleet capacity policy. He argues that the misguided use of subsidies for fleet renewal and modernization in the past sent the wrong signal to fishers, but capacity-reducing subsidies had also achieved little success with regard to the long-term, sustainable use of fisheries resources.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. I first set up the basic framework of the analysis. I then analyze the effects of reducing fisheries subsidies in a SOE in which the world relative price is exogenously given. I further extend the analysis to the case of trade between two countries. In the final section, I state some concluding remarks.
The Basic Model
In this section, I construct a simple model of worker behavior with a variable supply of labor.
6 There are two goods: fish, F, and manufactures, M. take good M as a numeraire and let the price of good M be one. Denote the price of fish as p. 
Conditions ii) and iii) mean that, given the resource stock and other fishers' catch, an increase in fishing effort yields more catch but the marginal catch is diminishing. Condition iv) means that, as other fishers catch more fish, the amount of catch falls for a given level of fishing effort, because the remaining number of fish is reduced. Condition v) means that an increase in the size of the resource stock raises the amount of catch for a given level of fishing effort. In order to obtain explicit solutions, I use a particular functional form for
where γ > 0 is a constant parameter. Denote that the total catch of fish as
, where N n ≤ is the number of persons who engage in fishing. The net change in the resource stock is the natural growth rate minus the total harvest:
Person i in the fisheries sector chooses x i , taking other fishers' total catch of fish F −i as a given. Let N i F and i x be the Nash equilibrium level of catch and fishing effort, respectively, which satisfies the first-order condition, as shown below. By imposing symmetry, equation (1) is rewritten as: which can be solved for
The total output of fish in the Nash equilibrium is hence given by:
7 the assumption of weak separability between consumption goods and leisure is popular in the literature of public economics. See, e.g., Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) . 8 Studies on open-access renewable resources demonstrate this mechanism. See, for example, Gordon (1954) and Brander and taylor (1997) .
then, in the short run (i.e., when S is fixed), an increase in x i raises the total output of fish:
In the manufacturing sector, on the other hand, "human capital" is used as a production factor. Person i's supply of human capital is h i x i , where h i is a parameter specific to the person and is a draw from distribution Ω(h) with support on ] , 0 [ h . one unit of good M is produced by a units of human capital. this implies that the wage w per unit of human capital in the manufacturing sector is given by w = 1/a (recall that good M is the numeraire). thus, income for those employed in the manufacturing sector is given by
is the number of persons employed in the manufacturing sector.
to simplify the analysis, I assume that each person can only work in one sector. Consumer tastes for consumption goods are quasi-concave and weakly separable across the set of consumption goods and leisure.
7 Utility of consumer i is given by
, where φ(f,m) is a linearly homogenous sub-utility function, and u is strictly increasing and strictly quasi-concave in φ and L i .
I assume that people are myopic in the sense that they maximize their current-period utility in each period. This means that when a person engages in fishing, he decides the optimal level of x i by taking the fish stock, S, as a given and ignoring the effect of x i on the change in S. the reason why I take this approach is that overexploitation of renewable natural resources is mainly caused by short-sighted behavior of people.
8 thus, it is important to see the effects on the incentives for short-sighted people.
Person i chooses m, f, and x i to maximize u i subject to the budget constraint: pf + m ≤ I i , where I i is income. When person i earns income in the fisheries sector, the income is given by I i = qF i + t -τ, where q = p + s is the domestic producer price of fish with s being subsidies to support the domestic price, t is income support from the government, and τ is the lump-sum tax. When the person earns income in the manufacturing sector, on the other hand, income is given by I i = wh i x i -τ . the government's budget is balanced by spending the difference between tax revenue and subsidy payments as government expenditure g. thus, τ is constant and unaffected by any changes in subsidy payments.
Since φ(⋅) is linearly homogenous, it yields:
( / ( ), ),
where β(p) is the true price index associated with φ(⋅).
When person i engages in fishing, the optimal supply of labor is determined by maximizing equation (6) subject to I i = qF i + t -τ . The first-order condition (FOC) is given by:
. Note that in equation (7), the term ( / ( )) i q p E represents the opportunity cost of labor.
9 the second-order condition (SoC) is given by:
where
2 2 / ( ) .
LL i i
u u x x I assume that Δ < 0 so that the SOC is satisfied.
When person i is employed in the manufacturing sector, on the other hand, the optimal supply of labor is determined by maximizing equation (6) subject to I i = wh i x i -τ. the FoC is given by:
Denote x i that satisfies equation (9) by i x . the SoC is given by:
.
I assume the right-hand side is negative so that the SOC is satisfied. the FoCs in equations (7) and (9) 
Substituting equation (4) into equation (10) yields the steady-state level of fisheries stock:
9 Unlike the standard model in fisheries economics, the cost of fishing is not explicitly included in this framework. However, it is shown that the model in which rent-maximizing resource harvesters employ labor supplied by utility-maximizing households by paying wages can replicate the results in this article. the analysis of the alternative model is available from the author upon request.
where i
x satisfies equation (7). Then, I have:
Kn e x r n n e thus, an increase in i
x unambiguously reduces the fisheries stock in steady states.
As is well known, the effect of a change in the steady-state level of fish stock on the fish output in steady states depends on the size of the stock. Differentiate equation (10) with respect to S ss to yield:
(1 2 / ). (resp. not over-exploited, or 
When is the fisheries stock over-exploited? From equation (11), it is easy to show that S ss < K/2 holds if: γ > r/2 and ˆlog(2
hold, where i x satisfies equation (7).
Fisheries Subsidies in a Small Open Economy (SOE)
Now, I examine how a reduction in existing fisheries subsidies will affect fisheries stock and output both in the short and long run. the main purpose of this section is to illustrate that the effects of reducing fisheries subsidies on fisheries output are dependent on the economy. I consider two types of subsidies. The first is income supports for workers in the fisheries sector. The second is price supports for fish products. In this analysis, I
consider two cases. The first case is that catch quotas are not enforced and there are no alternative employment opportunities for workers in the fisheries sector. The second case is that catch quotas are strictly enforced and there are alternative employment opportunities for workers in the fisheries sector. In this section, I assume that the country is small in the international market.
Unenforced Catch Quotas and no Alternative Employment Opportunities
I first consider the case where catch quotas are not enforced and there are no alternative employment opportunities for workers in the fisheries sector. There are no alternative employment opportunities for workers in the fisheries sector if the country is completely specialized in producing good F.
Let F be the catch quota. If the total catch is below F without enforcement, there is no problem. thus, the implicit assumption in this subsection is that the total catch is greater than F even in the absence of fisheries subsidies.
A reduction in income support is measured by a reduction in t. this is qualitatively the same as an exogenous reduction in non-labor income. I consider a permanent reduction in t. this change does not affect consumption allocation between good F and good M. However, it does affect the level of consumption of leisure. Since leisure is a normal good, a reduction in income leads to a reduction in leisure for an individual person. this implies that the person is willing to spend more time fishing. This effect can be obtained by totally differentiating the FoC for the optimal supply of labor (equation (7)):
Note that 0 < ∆ by the SoC, u φφ < 0, 0 > ′ i E , and u Lφ < 0. the overall sign of the terms in the square brackets is negative under the assumption that leisure is a normal good. this result implies that a reduction in t decreases L i and increases x i . this is true for all workers who engage in fishing and all workers in the economy work in the fisheries sector.
then, since from equation (5) an increase in x i also increases the fish output in the short run, it yields that a reduction in t unambiguously increases fish output in the short run. In the long run, by contrast, Proposition 1 implies that the effect of a reduction in t on the steady-state fish output depends on the conditions, while the steady-state fish stock is unambiguously reduced by a reduction in t through an increase in x i . If conditions (12) are satisfied, a reduction in t decreases the steady-state fish output. Otherwise, it increases the fish output in steady states. These results are summarized in the following proposition. This proposition demonstrates the possibility that a reduction in fisheries subsidies in the form of income support worsens the situation of over-exploited fisheries resources.
10
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the effects of a reduction in fisheries subsidies on fish stock and output in the short and long run. The case in which conditions (12) are satisfied is depicted in figure 1 . This corresponds to the case of over-exploited fisheries resources. The horizontal axis measures the level of fish stock, S. the vertical axis measures the units of fish. The inverted-U shape curve is the logistic growth equation, G(S). the solid upwardsloping line is the total catch schedule, F N (S). the current stock level is S t , and the current fish output is F t N . Since the current level of catch is higher than the natural growth rate, the stock shrinks toward the steady-state level, S ss . then, consider a reduction in t. Since it increases i x , it shifts the F N line up, as illustrated by a upward-sloping broken line. While the current output is higher, S ss shifts to the left and the steady-state level of output, N ss F , falls.
11 On the other hand, figure 2 illustrates the case in which fisheries resources are not over-exploited. As in the previous case, a reduction in t shifts up the F N line and leads to greater current output. However, the steady-state output, N ss F , is also greater, despite the lower level of steady-state fish stock.
10 This result implies that fisheries subsidies in the form of income support actually work as a subsidy by which fishers are bribed to catch fish less. This mechanism is quite similar to that of the subsidy program for farmers to take land out of agricultural production. I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this implication. 11 This result is opposite to the implication from the standard model of open-access fishery, which suggests that, when the fish stock is over-exploited, removing subsidies to fishing will increase both the steady-state stock and the steady-state catch. This difference comes from different responses by fishers. In the standard model, in which the supply of fishing effort is perfectly elastic, fishing effort is decreased in response to a reduction in subsidies because it increases costs of fishing. Here, in contrast, fishers respond to a decrease in income subsidies by increasing their fishing effort. This happens because a lower income reduces demand for leisure, which is a normal good. Note that the opportunity cost of labor, ( / ( )) i q p E , is unaffected by a change in income subsidies. is equivalent to a reduction in q. the effects of this price change on the optimal supply of labor can be decomposed as follows:
Fish stock (S)
In the above equation, the first term represents the substitution effect between leisure and aggregate consumption goods. this term is negative because 0 < ∆ and u φ > 0, implying that a reduction in s will decrease the optimal supply of labor. Since a reduction in s decreases the opportunity cost of leisure, it is optimal for a person to increase leisure and hence to decrease the supply of labor.
the second block of terms, including terms in the square brackets in equation (14), measures the income effect, which is positive. the reason is the same as that in equation (13) . Since a reduction in s decreases nominal income and since leisure is a normal good, then a reduction in s decreases leisure and hence increases the supply of labor. therefore, the overall effect depends on the relative size of these two effects. Actually, if the elasticity of substitution between leisure and aggregate consumption goods is less than one, the substitution effect is relatively small. In such a situation, the substitution effect is dominated by the income effect and hence a reduction in s increases the supply of labor. the effects of a reduction in s on the fisheries stock and output are then similar to those in Proposition 2. thus, as long as the elasticity of substitution between leisure and aggregate consumption goods is less than one, the effects of a reduction in s are similar to those of a reduction in t.
Enforced Catch Quotas and the Presence of Alternative Employment Opportunities
I now turn to the case in which catch quotas are strictly enforced and there are alternative employment opportunities for workers in the fisheries sector. The country is diversified, and workers can move across sectors under the conditions specified in the previous section.
A catch quota, F , is binding in each period if
. Under the binding quota, the output per person is simply given by dividing the quota by the number of workers in the fisheries sector.
As described in the previous section, the sectoral allocation of workers is determined by the relative level of individual income in the two sectors. As long as the catch quota is binding, the number of persons who work in the fisheries sector, n, is endogenously determined by:
x on the right-hand side satisfies equation (9) . If the catch quota is not binding, n is determined by:
x on the right-hand side satisfies equation (7). Now, consider a permanent reduction in t. If the catch quota is binding in each period, as is obvious from equation (15), n decreases because those who have relatively higher human capital move to the manufacturing sector. Consequently, a reduction in t increases the quota per person. However, as long as
F nE x holds, the total output of the fisheries sector remains the same in the long run as well as in the short run. The steady-state level of the fisheries stock also remains the same. Thus, a reduction in t has no impact on the fisheries stock and output at all. The situation is illustrated in figure 3 . In this figure, the horizontal line indicated as F F = represents the catch quota. the current fish stock is at S t . At this stock level, the unregulated total catch is at F t N , which is higher than the catch quota, F . thus, as long as the quota is strictly enforced, the actual total catch is F F = . the resource dynamics leads to the steady-state stock level, S ss . the actual total catch remains the same throughout the transition to steady state. then, although a reduction in t shifts the unregulated fishing schedule down, the unregulated total catch is still above the quota level. As a result, it has no impact on the fish output and hence the steady-state stock level also remains the same.
However, a further reduction in t may cause ( )
F nE x to hold. If that is the case, then the total output becomes lower both in the short and long run. Since pressure on the fisheries resource becomes weaker, the steady-state level of the fisheries stock increases. the following proposition summarizes the above analysis. Consider next a permanent reduction in subsidies, s. If the catch quota is binding, the number of persons working in the fisheries sector, n, is endogenously determined by:
If the catch quota is not binding, on the other hand, n is determined by: Unlike the case in the previous subsection, as long as the catch quota is properly set and strictly enforced, fish stocks are maintained in the long run. However, it is sometimes stated that catch quotas are set at levels that result in overfishing. This means that in the case illustrated in figure 3 , the locus of the F F = line is above F t N . If that is the case, the fisheries stocks can be reduced even if catch quotas are strictly enforced. Thus, it is important to note that the results in Propositions 4 and 5 do not guarantee that the fisheries resource stocks in this country are maintained at the appropriate level.
Subsidy Reform in Two-Country Trade
In this section, I extend the analysis to the case of trade between two countries: Home and Foreign. the basic structure of the economy in the previous sections is retained for both countries. Variables in Home are indicated with no asterisk, and those in Foreign are indicated with an asterisk (*). In order to simplify the analysis, I assume that fisheries resource stock exists in each country and that there is no interaction between the resource stocks in the two countries. Consider the case in which Home has a comparative advantage in producing good M and Foreign has a comparative advantage in producing good F. More specifically, I impose the following assumption. Under this assumption, Home exports good M and imports good F and Foreign exports good F and imports good M. Moreover, world demand (i.e., total demand in the two countries) for good F is sufficiently strong to require that even Home, which has a comparative disadvantage in producing good F, produces good F in the trading equilibrium. Also I assume that in Foreign the fisheries stock is over-exploited:
Assumption 2: In Foreign, conditions (12) Contrary to conventional wisdom, Proposition 6 shows that worldwide subsidy reform to reduce a type of fisheries subsidies could increase the world catch of fish in the short run. Moreover, since overfishing may be intensified by the subsidy reform, the steady-state level of the world fisheries stock may decrease. This counterintuitive result mainly arises from the endogenous supply of labor. the condition that the elasticity of substitution between leisure and the aggregate consumption goods is less than one is actually plausible and rather general, as Chichilnisky (1994) Similarly to Assumption 4, a change in s has no effect on the world supply of fish under the following assumption.
Proposition 7 shows that the effects of the subsidy reform that reduces s and s * on the fisheries sector are qualitatively similar to those of the reform that reduces t and t * . Under certain conditions, subsidy reform may have unintended impacts on the fisheries sector in the short and long run.
Concluding Remarks
In this article, I investigated the effects of reducing existing subsidies in the fisheries sector. The conventional wisdom is that fisheries subsidies cause overfishing, and hence a reduction in fisheries subsidies will contribute to mitigating overfishing and conserving fisheries resources. Conversely, the analysis herein suggests that under some conditions the opposite result may be true. That is, a reduction in fisheries subsidies may accelerate overfishing and reduce fisheries resource stocks. The key is how the change in subsidies will affect the incentives of workers who engage in fisheries. If a reduction in subsidies causes workers to put more effort into fishing, it may yield unexpected and undesirable results in counties where fisheries resources are not properly managed. Therefore, in designing new regulations on fisheries subsidies at the WTO, the effects of reducing fisheries subsidies should be carefully examined after consideration of the conditions in different countries. Strengthening fisheries resource management will ensure that subsidy reform mitigates overfishing and conserves fisheries resources.
The focus of this article was on the effects of subsidies on fisheries output and fish stocks. As mentioned in the introduction, however, the issue that subsidies contribute to the problems of overcapacity and rent dissipation in the fisheries sector is also important. A number of previous studies argue that when harvest is restricted by a total allowable catch (TAC) quota and factor inputs are controlled, fishers have an incentive to hold overcapacity, which results in rent dissipation Cunningham and Gréboval 2001; Asche, Bjørndal, and Gordon 2009) . 12 In this situation, since subsidies increase the incentive to hold overcapacity, a reduction in those subsidies will improve economic efficiency in fisheries sector. 13 Although this issue is beyond the scope of this article, the next step is to examine the impact of reducing subsidies on fishing capacity and rent in the fisheries sector.
